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In our model of socially responsible (SR) product differentiation two duopolists (a 
zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete 
over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their 
products under a given law of motion of consumer’s habits. In a continuous time 
model in which the location of the zero profit socially responsible entrant is fixed and 
the profit maximizing producer (PMP) limits himself to price competition without SR 
imitation, we show that the optimal dynamic PMP’s price is always lower than his 
optimal static price since the PMP knows that, by leaving too much market share to 
his competitor, he will reinforce the habit of socially responsible consumption and 
loose further market share in the future. We also inspect the properties of equilibria 
when the PMP can imitate the entrant’s SR and we find that, in this case, the threshold 
triggering a PMP strategy of SR imitation and minimum price differentiation is higher 
in the dynamic than in the static case, depending on the PMP’s shadow cost of 
changes in consumer social responsibility. 
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 1 Introduction
Corporate social responsibility is rapidly emerging as a new relevant com-
petitive variable in product markets. A likely explanation for this new phe-
nomenon is that the reduction of distances induced by technological progress
has increased the importance of global public goods and the sensitiveness of
the public opinion toward the preservation of the environment and the ﬁght
against poverty in less developed countries. This increased awareness has
generated a series of “grassroot” welfare initiatives which focus on socially
responsible (or socially concerned) saving and consumption. One of them
is promoted by zero proﬁt importers, distributors and retailers (called fair
traders)1 of food and textile products which have been partially or wholly
manufactured by poor rural communities in developing countries. To be
labelled as such, fair trade products need to respect a series of social and
environmental criteria. Fair trade is just a small part of the market for so-
cially responsible consumption (and savings) which is considerably growing.
Fair trade products are beginning to achieve non negligible market shares.
They captured around 2.5% of the tea market in Germany, 2.7% of the coﬀee
market in the Netherlands and about 15% of the banana market in Switzer-
land in the year 2000. The existence of positive market shares for these
products, whose price is often higher than that of traditional products, is
a revealed preference argument for the relevance of socially concerned con-
sumption and for the existence of ethical fairness arguments in consumers’
utility function2. The diﬀusions of forms of socially responsible consump-
1The deﬁnition of fair trade in this paper is quite diﬀerent from the traditional meaning
of “Fair trade” in the ﬁeld of industrial organization. From the 1930s onward (although
there are antecedents going back to 1900), in both the US and the UK, the term refers to
schemes that industry trade associations used to regulate competition among members,
usually by requiring that prices be posted in advance and that no transactions take place
except at posted prices. During the Great Depression in the U.S. such schemes were part
of the National Recovery Act. In the more recent literature fair trade indicates “argu-
ments that relate to certain conditions under which trade, and the production of traded
goods, should minimally take place”(Maseland and Vaal, 2002[15]). In this framework fair
trade generally refers to the absence of duties, controls and dumping practices in inter-
national trade (for a similar use of term, for example, see also Mendoza-Bahadur,2002[1];
Bhagwati,1996[3]; Stiglitz, 2002[17]; Suranovic, 2002[18]). The fair trade products we re-
fer to in this paper are, on the contrary, food and artisan products which obtain the fair
trade label when their production process follow some criteria for social and environmental
sustainability established by the movement of fair trade importers and retailers.
2There is a growing interest for socially responsible savings and consumption also in the
institutions. In 1999 the United Nations launched the Global Compact, a coalition of large
businesses, trade unions and environmental and human rights groups, brought together to
share a dialogue on corporate social responsibility. In the same year the European Com-
mission issued a document on Fair Trade (29.11.1999 COM(1999) 619. In its introduction
it is stated that “Fair trade” is an example of development occurring through trading rela-
tionships and improved commercial opportunities to bridge the gap between developed and
developing countries and to facilitate the better integration of developing countries in the
world economy. “Fair trade” initiative give consumers the opportunity to contribute to-
3tion such as fair trade is accompanied by a wide range of imitation strategies
enacted by traditional producers. Many companies are starting advertising
not only price and quality, but also their socially responsible actions3. Ac-
cording to BBC news, on October the 7th, 2000 Nestle has launched a fair
trade instant coﬀee as it looks to tap into growing demand among consumers.
The BBC comments the news saying that “Ethical shopping is an increasing
trend in the UK, as consumers pay more to ensure poor farmers get a bet-
ter deal.” and reports the comment of Fiona Kendrick, Nestle’s UK head of
beverages arguing that “Speciﬁcally in terms of coﬀee, fair trade is 3 percent
of the instant market and has been growing at good double-digit growth and
continues to grow.” One of the world’s biggest players in the coﬀee market,
the US consumer good company Procter & Gamble, announced it would
begin oﬀering Fair Trade certiﬁed coﬀee through one of its specialty brands.
Following Procter & Gamble’s decision to start selling a Fair Trade coﬀee,
also Kraft Foods, another coﬀee giant, committed itself to purchasing sus-
tainably grown coﬀee. Furthermore, Kraft will buy 5m pounds of Rainforest
Alliance certiﬁed coﬀee in the ﬁrst year, according to an agreement between
Kraft Foods and the Rainforest Alliance (EFTA Advocacy Newsletter n 9).
What pushes large transnationals such as Kraft, Nestl or Starbucks to in-
troduce new lines of socially responsible (fair trade) products ? Why they
voluntarily reduce their proﬁt margins on these products to increase their
social and environmental sustainability by paying more to subcontractors or
commodity producers and introducing higher environmental standards ?
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical background for this
emerging form of competition. We do so by adopting a vertical diﬀerentia-
tion approach and by reinterpreting the quality space in terms of ethical or
“social responsibility” space.
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections (including introduction and con-
clusions). In the second section we present the basic features of the vertical
diﬀerentiation model. In the third section we analyze the dynamic model in
which a proﬁt maximizing producer (henceforth PMP) competes in prices
(but not in ethical location) with an “ethically”4 concerned producer (hence-
forth fair trader or FT). Finally, we remove the assumption of PMP’s ﬁxed
wards sustainable economic and social development in developing countries through their
purchasing preferences. More recently, in July 2001, Commission issued a Green Book
COM(2001) 366 to promote ﬁrm social responsibility in the European framework. large
part of the Green Book deals with fair trade.
3Corporate perception by consumers (90 percent of respondents) is by far the most
selected item (against ethical values of managers, tax incentives and relationship with
stakeholders) when a sample of interviewed socially responsible companies is asked about
reasons for their socially responsible behavior in the “2003 Corporate social responsibility
monitor”(downloadable at http:\ \ www.bdgglobal.com/issues/sr.asp).This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with our hypothesis that ethical imitation is today a relevant competitive feature
in product markets.
4Throughout all the paper we will call indiﬀerently this player as SR or ethical player
for simplicity and convenience. This does not imply any value judgement on the lack of
4ethical location and let this producer jointly choose ethical location and
prices in continuous time. In this section we evaluate the net contribution
of FT to the PMP’ SR behaviour.
2 The model
Most of the hypotheses in the model which follows are standard assumptions
in the product diﬀerentiation literature. Some others are original and are
given by the speciﬁc nature of ethical competition. A proﬁt maximizing mo-
nopolist sells a good to consumers with inelastic, unit demands. Consumers
are uniformly distributed across the line segment [0,1] according to their
concerns for social responsibility. The monopolist activity consists of trans-
forming raw materials received from unskilled producers in the South, paid
with a monopsony wage(w)5. The ﬁnal product is sold to consumers in the
North. The monopolist maximizes proﬁts by ﬁxing a price PA for his prod-
uct. In this ﬁrst version of the model we assume, for simplicity, and without
lack of generality, that the incumbent has no social responsibility and is lo-
cated at one extreme of the ethical segment (position a = 0). Consider now,
in a ﬁxed location case, the eﬀects on the incumbent strategy of the entry of
a socially concerned producer which generally takes a diﬀerent position on
the ethical segment and ﬁxes a price PB for his product. This producer, ex-
actly as the fair trader described in the introduction (this is the reason why
we call him also FT), is zero proﬁt and his goal is to maximize transfers to
raw material producers in the South to raise their wage from monopsony to
competitive levels6 and to transfer resources which can be invested in local
public goods to improve future market opportunities for these producers7.
The socially responsible features of the entrant therefore consist of selling
ethics of the other competitor.
5The reality is more complex since, under an alternative but equally valid approach,
fair traders usually break excess bargaining powers of local buyers or transportation inter-
mediaries which force local producers to sell primary or intermediate products at prices
below what they would earn in a competitive market (with equal bargaining power be-
tween sellers and buyers). We nonetheless believe that our simple approach captures the
essential point of the issue.
6We take the fair trader as an example of socially responsible producer and identify
social responsibility in the resources transferred to producers in the South. Our model
may be generalized and applied also to environmentally concerned producers by assuming
that there are not “free lunches” in environmental responsibility and that the adoption
of environmentally responsible production processes increases costs exactly as in our fair
trader’s example.
7The diﬀusion of producers which create private and social value without being proﬁt
maximizers is conﬁrmed by the fact that fair trade producers exist and are growing. In the
year 2000 there were 97 fair trade importers from 18 countries and 2740 no proﬁt retailers
of fair trade products only in Europe according to Fair Trade Association. In 2000, in the
US and Canada, 600 outlets wholesaled Fair trade products, while at least 2575 oﬀered
retail. In 2001, at least 7000 provided retail.
5his product at zero proﬁt 8and transferring a “free margin” s to ﬁnance
investment in public goods and education in the South (exactly as the “fair
trade” does in the reality). The FT zero proﬁt condition is: PB = w(1+s).
We assume that social responsibility depends on the amount s transferred
to the South. Therefore the amount of this transfer determines the position
on the segment9. In this ﬁrst example, for simplicity, fair trader’s location
is exogenously set at the right extreme of the ethical segment so that s = 1.
After FT’s entry consumers may choose between products which diﬀer in
process and socially responsible features. The diﬀerence with respect to the
traditional product diﬀerentiation models is that opposite locations in the
consumers interval do not imply diﬀerences in physical distances, but in the
psychological perception of the ethical value of the good10. The considera-
tion of ethical instead of physical distance makes an important diﬀerence.
Consistently with our concept of ethical distance, we assume that the cost of
moving along the line segment is positive only for those going from a more
ethical to a less ethical point (Figure 1). As a consequence, they incur in
costs proportional to the “ethical” distance anytime they move to the left11.
8The competition between a proﬁt maximising and a zero proﬁt producer relates our
model to the mixed duopoly literature (Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1991)[7]; Grilo,
(1994)[11]) with the qualifying diﬀerence that the zero proﬁt producer is not public and
is concerned with welfare in the South and not with product quality in the North.
9Consider again that, since environmental responsibility is one of the main features of
fair trade products, the reasoning of our model also applies when we replace the socially
responsible (transfer to the South) with environmentally responsible (adoption of a more
environmental product) feature of the ethical entrant. In this case we should assume a
trade-oﬀ between environmental sustainability and production costs by assuming that the
producer chooses a technique with an added marginal cost s for any unit sold, generated
by the adoption of environmentally sustainable practices.
10In the model we abstract from considerations of asymmetric information and diver-
gences between consumers’ and sellers’ perception of the ethical value of the good by
assuming that they coincide. To reduce distance from reality it may be interesting in an
extension of this model, to analyse market equilibria under asymmetric information and
to consider the role of ethical labelling.
11The rationale for this assumption is that moving to the left implies choosing a product
below one’s ethical standards (which is psychologically costly), while moving to the right
implies choosing a product above one’s own ethical standards (and therefore we assume it
does not give any psychological cost to the buyer). A large number of empirical ﬁndings
clearly evidence the existence of a nonzero share of consumers which are not willing to
pay extra money for social or environmental features of the product. To make an example
descriptive evidence from the World Value Survey database (65,660 (15,443) individuals
interviewed between 1980 and 1990 (1990 and 2000) in representative samples of 30 (7)
diﬀerent countries) show that around 45 (49) percent of sample respondents are not willing
to pay in excess for environmentally responsible features of a product. These consumers
are either indiﬀerent (thereby supporting our view of asymmetric costs of SR distance) or
even ﬁnd a disutility in buying a product above their ethical standards (i.e., they may be-
lieve that this money is waisted supporting the view of symmetric costs of distance). Even
though we believe that the chosen one is the most faithful formalization of consumers’ pref-
erences on SR, the simmetry/asymmetry of distance costs may be open to debate. While
a choice of symmetric costs of ethical distance would have placed the model deﬁnitely into
6We assume that consumers utilities are decreasing in product price and also
in the distance between consumer’s ethical distance and the ethical value
incorporated in the purchased product. The psychological cost of buying a
product which is below one’s own ethical standards is f times the ethical
distance so that consumer’s welfare when he satisﬁes his unit demand is
Wc = Rp − Pi − f(x − a), if x − a ≥ 012.
or
Wc = Rp − Pi, if x − a < 0
where Pi is the price of product sold by the i-th seller, Rp is the common
consumers’ reservation price and x denotes the generic consumer location
on the ethical segment 13. After FT’s entry the consumer’s indiﬀerence con-
dition is equal to
(
PA + f(x − a) = PB if x − a ≥ 0
PA = PB if x − a < 0
It is clear that the FT has a nonzero market share when, for given val-
ues of x, f(x − a) > PB − PA. Since in this ﬁrst simple case we set a = 0,





the horizontal diﬀerentiation ﬁeld, our choice of asymmetric costs of ethical distance places
it in the vertical diﬀerentiation literature. For a reference to the traditional literature on
horizontal product diﬀerentiation see Hotelling (1929)[13]; D’Aspremont, Gabsewicz and
Thisse (1979)[9]; Economides (1984)[10]; Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)[14], while for verti-
cal diﬀerentiation the seminal paper is Shaked-Sutton (1983)[19]. In a synthesis of the two
perspectives Craemer and Thisse (1991)[8] show that location horizontal diﬀerentiation
models can be considered as special cases of vertical diﬀerentiation models.
12The way we design consumers preferences is consistent with empirical evidence and
consumers surveys in which values are shown to be a determinant of choices together with
prices (see footnote 1 on 2003 Corporate social responsibility monitor). From a theoretical
point of view this point has been remarkably analyzed, among others, by Sen (1993) [16],
showing that people choose also on the basis of their values and, for this reason, they do
not always choose what they would strictly prefer on the basis of prices.
13With the speciﬁcation of the FT’s behavior and consumer’s position on the segment
the cost of ethical distance has a clear monetary counterpart. When the producer is
located at the right of the consumer this cost represents the distance in monetary terms
between the transfer which is considered fair by the consumer (indicated by his location on
the segment), and the transfer provided by the producer (indicated by producer’s location
on the segment). The coeﬃcient f maps this objective measure into subjective consumers’
preferences indicating whether its impact on consumers utility is proportional (f = 1),
more than proportional (f > 1) or less than proportional (f < 1) than its amount in
monetary terms.
73 The SR diﬀerentiation model with simultaneous
moves and open-loop strategies.
We now analyze what happens if the PMP chooses his strategies by taking
into account that consumers’ ethical preferences may change over time as a
function of his location strategies. To do so we consider a dynamic model
where that the PMP maximizes his objective function (the present value of
his proﬁt function) over an inﬁnite time horizon, by designing a strategy for
those variables which are under his control. Control variables are location
and price and their choice inﬂuences the PMP objective function as well as
the state of the consumers ethical preferences through a diﬀerential equation
(the “law of motion of consumers’ habit for social responsibility”).
3.1 The dynamic model when FT location is exogenous and
PMP’s ethical location is ﬁxed.
In this ﬁrst simpliﬁed version of the model, locations of the two players are
ﬁxed. Therefore the PMP does not imitate the FT in social responsibility
and competes only in prices. The PMP maximizes in continuous time the











subject to the following law of motion of consumers’ social responsibility
(





, t > 0
f(0) = f0 > 0
(2)
with PA ∈ (w,PB).
14
The law of motion in (2) tells us that changes in consumers’ social respon-
sibility are aﬀected, negatively, by depreciation from current levels of social
14Consider also that i) to rule out positive values generated by the product of negative
margins and negative market shares we only look at solutions under a positive mark-up
constraint and ii)the PMP price cannot be higher than the FT price for real and positive
values of PMP’s market shares.
8responsibility (the parameter θ) and, positively, by the habit reinforcement
generated by current aggregate consumption of socially responsible products
15
By solving the maximization problem we may state the following proposition
Proposition 3.1 In a continuous time model in which the proﬁt maximiz-
ing producer limits himself to price competition without ethical imitation,
and faces a zero proﬁt socially responsible entrant with a ﬁxed location, the
PMP optimal behavior is to reduce prices in order to limit his competitor
market share and, consequently, the formation of SR habits.
Proof: To solve the problem we formulate the following current value Hamil-
tonian:













We maximize H with respect to the control variable PA.







PA − w − λ
f
= 0 (4)
where λ, the costate variable, may be interpreted as the marginal value
(cost) of the variation in consumers’ social responsibility for the PMP.
Solving (4) for PA, and substituting for PB, we obtain the dynamic price
reaction function of the PMP
P∗




15Our law of motion of consumer habits reﬂects a typical property of the vast liter-
ature on habit persistence models in which θ is a decay parameter which regulates the
rate of consumption persistence (see, among others, Constantinides and Ferson (1991)[6]
and Braun, Constantinides and Ferson (1993)[5]. Since sellers of CSR products typically
advertise their products when selling them by accompanying them with detailed project
description leaﬂets which increase consumer awareness on product characteristics, we con-
veniently assume that consumer care for SR is related to the aggregate level of sales. The
hypothesis is supported by ﬁndings from a recent econometric analysis from Becchetti and
Rosati(2004[2]) on a sample of around one thousand FT consumers showing that consump-
tion habits have a signiﬁcant eﬀects on knowledge of FT criteria which, in turn, increases
consumption of FT products. A similar approach is followed by Grilo, Shy and Thisse
(2001)[12] when modelling consumers conformity. To ﬁnd reference of the link between
advertising and the shift of consumer tastes towards one product see among others (Bloch
and Delphine, (1999)[4]) .
9consider also that λ solves the following diﬀerential equation:





(λ(t) − (PA(t) − w)) (6)
and the model has the following non transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
λ(t)e−ρt = 0 (7)
By inspecting second order conditions we can see that the optimal price in





When looking for PA long term equilibrium value, we need to solve for
the steady state values of PA and f in the two diﬀerential equation system
of P0
A and (2)obtaining the following solutions:
f1 =
(ρ + 2θ) −
p




(ρ + 2θ) +
p
ρ + 2θ)2 − θ[w(θ + ρ) + 1](2ρ + 3θ)
θ(2ρ + 3θ)
(9)






1 − 2ρw +
p











ρ + θ +
p




16This implies that, for w = 1, the loss of ethical memory must be below 2/5 for
reasonable parameters ranges of the discount rate otherwise the model is not informative
about the likely equilibria. Actually θ is 0.42 with ρ = 0.85 and 0.436 with ρ = 0.95.
With these values we ﬁnd that PA∗ always respects the condition w < PA < w(1 + s).







ρ + θ −
p




As we can see, in each equilibrium price, the second part measures the
equilibrium value of λ, which is negative, as expected, when the market
share eﬀect of a change in social responsibility dominates over other eﬀects.
Since λ is the PMP’s shadow value (cost) of a change in consumers’ ethical
perception, equation (7) tells that, By being negative, a higher λ implies a
higher penalty from changes in consumers’ ethical perception and therefore
leads to a lower PMP optimal price in the dynamic than in the static case
(see Becchetti and Solferino, 2003[?]). The intuition behind this result is
that, by doing this, the PMP may preserve larger market shares and there-
fore reduce formation of socially responsible consumer habits (for further
details see the Appendix). With λ = 0 we obtain the static version of the
price reaction function. By inspecting it, we ﬁnd that the incumbent price is
obviously increasing in the fair trade transfer to the South. An inspection of
the properties of the incumbent’s price strategy after the fair trader’s entry
shows us that his optimal price is halfway between his zero proﬁt price and
the zero proﬁt fair trader’ price. This means that the incumbent divides the
distance between these two prices in two halves. One of them is his margin
and the other is the extent of the price cut.
If we analyze properties of the steady state and dynamics around equi-
librium we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst equilibrium point is an unstable node and is
obtained at lower levels of consumers social responsibility and PMP price.
The second is a saddlepath and is obtained at a higher consumers social
responsibility and PMP price. (A detailed analysis of properties and impli-
cations of this multiple equilibria solution is provided in the Appendix).
4 The continuous time model when the PMP chooses
prices and ethical location and FT’s ethical lo-
cation is exogenously ﬁxed
In this version of the model the PMP maximizes the following intertemporal












subject to the following law of motion of consumers’ social responsibility
(










, t > 0
f(0) = f0 > 0
(13)
under the usual constraints of a ∈ [0,1], PA ∈ (w,PB).
Note that (13) is slightly diﬀerent from the law of motion (2) presented
in the previous section, as, in this case, also the PMP may contribute to
reinforce the habit of ethically responsible consumption in proportion to its
market share, weighted by its degree of imitation of the FT.
We may start looking at this problem as an unconstrained maximization
problem searching for interior solutions. Therefore we consider the follow-
ing current value Hamiltonian:
















































+2aλ = 0 (16)
We may rewrite (15) as:
λ(a − 1) = PB − PA + af − PA + w(1 + as)
and by replacing in (16), under the usual assumption of s exogenously set
12equal to one, we get:




This solution is beyond constraints of PMP’s ethical location. Therefore
there are no internal maxima for this problem. We then look at solutions
on the constraints and, in particular, where the PMP ﬁnds it optimal to un-
dercut PB price and P∗
A = PB − ε (which we will further demonstrate to be
the optimal corner solution); with ε small enough to make PMP price lower













subject to the usual law of motion of consumers’ social responsibility
(










, t > 0
f(0) = f0 > 0
(18)
Solving the Hamiltonian for the ﬁrst order condition on a we get:
∂H
∂a







− λ + λ
ε
f











since ε is a small and ﬁxed quantity we may approximate (19) with:
−2a(t) − λ(t) + 2a(t)λ(t) + 1 = 0 (20)
and therefore we obtain a∗ ∼ =
1
2.
When we replace a* in (18), the law of motion becomes:






13and, by imposing f0 = 0, we ﬁnd the steady state level of consumers’ social
responsibility (P∗
A and a∗ are always steady state levels since they are con-
stant and therefore P0
A and a0 are equal to zero). We then obtain f∗ = 3
4θ
with f∗ being lower, the higher the consumers’ loss of ethical memory. We
must check whether this is the maximum proﬁt solution by comparing it
with those on the other sides of the “constraint square” whose corners in
the [a, PA] space are (0, PB − ε; 0, w + k; 1,PB − ε; 1, w + k) (with k
small enough). Intuitively it is impossible that PA = w + k because the
corresponding proﬁt would be low and we are in the point of the minimum
possible price for the PMP. The only alternative is the solution in which
ethical location is constrained to a = 0, and the price is optimally set by the
PMP (we therefore fall in the situation of section 3.1 in which PMP ethical
location was ﬁxed).
To analyse the optimal equilibrium choice of the PMP in the long run we
must compare his intertemporal proﬁts under the two cases (with a = 0 and
a∗ approaching to 1
2).
We may summarize the main results of this analysis in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 4.1 i) If in t = 0 we are on some points on the stable path,
the optimal control a = 0 will be a feasible solution for the steady state
equilibrium only in a ﬁnite time interval. ii) for high enough values of t,
the PMP may achieve a higher level of proﬁts in steady-state, by choosing
partial ethical imitation with a = 1
2. iii) In all the other cases, PMP will
not opt for ethical imitation location only if f(t) < sw − λ(t)
Proof.
i)it’s clear, as we have shown in the previous section, that the steady state
equilibrium E2 represents a possible solution only if in t = 0 we are in some
points lying on the stable path (this is the case only for some speciﬁc para-
metric values of θ and ρ, as found in the Appendix), otherwise it will be
impossible to reach a stable equilibrium.
ii)For t → ∞, and for given parametric values of θ and ρ, f0 lyes on the
stable path. In this case in order to analyze the optimal PMP choice in
steady-state, we must compare his intertemporal proﬁt values in both cases
for a = 0 and a = 1














which is always true under reasonable parameter values for ρ and θ (see
footnote 17).
iii)To analyse the optimal PMP location choice in a more general context,
















and we must compare this expression with the Hamiltonian for a ∼ =
1
2, for a


































which implies, that, in order to have PMP partial ethical imitation, the
following condition must hold:
f(t) > sw − λ(t)
If we compare this result with the one obtained in the static case (where a
lower value of f is requested in order to have PMP ethical imitation), it is
clear that in the dynamic version of the model the PMP ﬁnds it optimal not
to foster consumers’ sensitiveness to SR and therefore will choose not to im-
itate, unless for very high values of consumers ethical attitudes. Moreover,
in a previous analysis Becchetti et al.(2005)[?] showed that this is the same
necessary condition for a more ethical PMP also in the absence of a Fair
trader. This implies that only information about the existence of a share of
ethical consumers may induce the PMP to change its SR attitude. On the
other side, FT’s competition increases PMP’s SR when consumers reserva-
tion price is close to the FT price. In fact, Becchetti et al.(2005)[?] ﬁnd in
their analysis that the PMP’s ethical choice when he is alone on the market
is a = RP−w
2(sw−λ(t)) which, for λ < 0 (as demonstrated in the Appendix), is
lower than 1
2, for RP = w(1+s). The comparison of our ﬁndings with those
15of this paper suggest that, when λ is negative and large, the SR stance of
the PMP is much larger (even for high consumers conditional reservation
prices) in presence of the FT than when he is alone on the market. In such
case we may conclude that the FT has a critical role in triggering PMP
imitation in SR.
5 Conclusions
The model analyses the unexplored scenario of competition in social respon-
sibility between a zero proﬁt and a traditional proﬁt maximizing producer.
It shows that the PMP reacts in prices and ethical location to the entry of
a socially concerned producer. If consumers’ care for social responsibility is
below a given threshold, he limits himself to price competition, oﬀering his
products at a discount with respect to the “socially responsible” product
(the discount varies according to the PMP rate of intertemporal preference
and to the law of motion of consumers’ socially responsible habits). If con-
sumers responsibility is above the same threshold, he ﬁnds it optimal to
imitate partially the social responsible producer by choosing minimum price
diﬀerentiation and about one half of the socially responsible producer’s social
transfer. The paper also shows that the present value of the PMP shadow
cost of changes in consumers social responsibility crucially determines dif-
ferences in equilibria between the static and the dynamic game: i) it makes
PMP’s price competition higher in the dynamic with respect to the static
model, ii) it raises the threshold of consumers’ social responsibility which
triggers PMP’s ethical imitation. The rationale for the observed diﬀerences
between the static and the dynamic analysis is that, in the dynamic frame-
work, the PMP must care about intertemporal eﬀects of its current strategies
on consumers SR habit persistence and on his future proﬁts. A comparison
with previous ﬁndings on PMP’s optimal SR choice when he is alone on the
market shows that, when the shadow price of changes in consumer SR is
high (and even for large consumers conditional reservation prices), FT entry
in the market raises signiﬁcantly PMP SR choice. This implies that zero
proﬁt entrants such as the FT may have had a signiﬁcant role in fostering
SR habits in current product markets.
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18Appendix
Steady state properties of the equilibrium when the PMP location is ﬁxed.
To analyze properties of the steady state equilibrium in section 3.1 we must
consider that the two diﬀerential equation system, formed by P0
A = 0 and
(2), is highly nonlinear. Being
P0
A = 1












a = ρ + θ;b = 2w + sw;c = PB;x = PA and y = f









The intersections of this function with the two axes are as follows
A1 ≡ (0, c √
ab),A2 ≡ (c,0)
Consider that we are only interested to solutions for which b
2 > x. To iden-


















But this last inequality corresponds exactly to PA − w > 0. Therefore the
19derivative is increasing in the feasible set of PA values. Moreover, since it is
possible to show that the P0
A = 0 locus is convex in the feasible set b/2 > x,
and, given that the set of the real numbers is constrained to b/2 > x, we are
interested only to the area in which the locus is convex. The second locus
is:1 − θf − PB−PA
f = 0. By totally diﬀerentiating this expression we ﬁnd
that:






which is a decreasing function f < 1/2 and increases when the inequality
is reversed. This means that, when consumers’ social responsibility is high,
an increase in the PMP price is consistent with higher steady state levels
of consumers social responsibility in equilibrium. This eﬀect is due to the
increase in the FT market share after the PMP price rise. On the contrary,
for lower levels of consumers social responsibility, the opposite occurs and
the steady state in the law of motion of consumers social responsibility is
such that higher PMP prices imply lower levels of consumers social responsi-
bility. This occurs because, for low levels of consumers social responsibility,
the negative eﬀect of the loss of ethical memory is higher than the positive
impact of the increase in the FT share after PMP price rise. To identify
the position of the two steady state loci in the [PA, f] space consider that
df0
dPA = 1
f > 0 and
dP0
A
df = − 2
f3(PB−PA)2 < 0. The sign of the ﬁrst derivative
implies that, as far as the PMP raises his price, his market share tends to
shrink and consumers social responsibility gets higher. The sign of the sec-
ond derivative implies that, when consumers social responsibility is higher,
the PMP reduces his price not to loose too much market share. We then have
two equilibria, the ﬁrst is an unstable node and is obtained at lower levels of
consumers social responsibility and PMP price. The second is a saddlepath
and is obtained at higher consumers social responsibility and PMP price.
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram in which the two curves intersect each
other in two points which correspond to the two equilibria E1 = (f1,PA1)
and E2 = (f2,PA2). Around the ﬁrst equilibrium social responsibility is so
low that the depreciation eﬀect dominates. Going rightward and below the
equilibrium point, we may collapse to a point in which social responsibility
goes to zero and the PMP price is moderately low. Going leftward and
above this unstable node, the rise of social responsibility and/or PMP price
leads to the area of the second equilibrium and to his saddlepath. Along
this saddlepath we converge to the second equilibrium in which PMP prices
are moderately low and consumers social responsibility is above one (the
leftward monetary distance between the transfer considered fair by a given
consumer and the eﬀective transfer has more than proportional eﬀects on
20consumers preferences). In this equilibrium f is above one for reasonable
parameters ranges of ρ and θ (and tends to be much larger, the lower the
loss of ethical memory) and the PMP sells his product at a discount between
.5 and .75 of the FT price.
Remark 5.1 It’s clear that in order to reach E2, which is a saddle point,
we should be on the stable path at the beginning of the problem or in t = 0.
We also know that, before FT entry, the PMP practices a monopolistic price
higher than P∗
A, therefore we are in a situation such that in t = 0, the PMP
price P(0) = PM is on the right side of P∗
A and the only way to be on the
stable path is that f(0) must stand on the upper side of the curve f0 = 0 or
satisfy the equation








1 − 4θ(PB − PA)
2θ
Proposition 5.2 A positive PMP’s market share necessarily implies in equi-
librium a negative λ, or a negative shadow value of changes in consumers’
social responsibility for the PMP.
To demonstrate this proposition we show that λ needs to be negative when
the PMP’s market share is nonzero in the steady state. Consider a diﬀerent
system in which we look at market shares instead of PMP’s price dynamics.






Af − (PB − PA)f0
f2
Since PB is assumed to be exogenous and constant, PMP’s market share
varies in time only for changes in the PMP price PA and in consumers’ eth-
ical perception f. To ﬁnd P0
A we diﬀerentiate (7) with respect to time and















This equation clearly shows that an increase in prices leads to further pos-
itive changes of the optimal price in time if the combined eﬀect on proﬁts
21(increased margin on a reduced market share) in the second addend domi-
nates the (expected negative) eﬀect generated by the marginal cost in terms
of PMP proﬁts of a change in social responsibility of consumers. By replac-












By replacing this value and f0 from (2) in z0, we obtain:
z0 =
−1







Given that, when P0
A = f0 = 0, also z0 = 0, the steady state of the (z,f)
system corresponds to the steady state of the (PA,f) system.
In steady state, for f 6= 0, z0 6= 0 implies that:
z2 − 2z(1 − θf) − (ρ + θ)(2PA − 2w − sw) = 0
We obtain steady state values of the market share and of consumers ethical
perception by solving the two equation system made by (13) and (1−θ)f = 0,
which is the stationary counterpart of the law of motion in (2). By replacing
this last expression in the equation above, and ruling out negative values of










Note that this expression establishes that, for having a nonzero market share
the PMP must ﬁx a price below his static optimal price (the ﬁrst part of the
expression under square brackets). This result also tells us that the shadow
value of λ is negative, as expected, since the PMP must increase his price
competition if he want to avoid a dynamics of increasing social responsibility
which will lead to further reduction of his market share in the future.
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